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In a number of discussion rounds we held within our research project “Univer-
sality and Acceptance Potential of Social Science Knowledges: On the Circulation of
Knowledge between Europe and the Global South” (University of Freiburg, 2010-14),
my dear colleague Veronika Wöhrer insisted that feminist standpoint theory provided
the solutions needed to move towards global sociology without Eurocentric biases.
Go’s paper [2016] reads like the one I always expected Veronika to write, a good
reason for us to be green with envy. Luckily, at least, I was invited to comment on
this paper.
To start with, I congratulate the author for this piece. I’d like to quote two
crucial sentences from his text:
Scientific pluralism permits multiple objectivities. The choice between pure
Cartesian objectivity and dangerous relativism is a false one that must be thrown
out once and for all [Ibidem, p.23].
This is the essence of Go’s argument, and in my view it marks an important
intellectual achievement in the debate on globalization of sociology. I believe that
in future debate, we should not back down from this point. It is not necessary here
to repeat the epistemological and ontological argument that underpins the author’s
statement. Thus I agree with the core argument of Go’s paper; I particularly welcome
his fundamental take on a debate where geopolitical and identity-political arguments
on the one hand and silent ignorance on the other have often made it difficult to grasp
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its far-reaching epistemological consequences for our discipline as a whole. Starting
from this acknowledgment, my comment first includes a complementary argument;
second, a few minor criticisms; and third, two more fundamental questions that go
beyond the text.
First I wish to complement the author’s proposal of alternative analytical strat-
egy for overcoming metrocentrism and globalizing sociology. His argument is rooted
first in an epistemological stance on how social science knowledge is – or should
be – produced and second in an underlying ontology of what the world is like. I
would like to return to my earlier works to complement this with another alternative
strategy; not an analytical but a practical one. I formulated this argument with regard
to the development of South African labour studies [Keim 2008]. When I started
research for my book at the beginning of the 2000s, the debate on the globalization
of sociology and the necessity to develop alternative strategies was not my first moti-
vation. Rather what sparked my interest was mostly stupefaction about the complete
absence of references to the intellectual production from the global Souths during
my entire university education in Germany and France. This led me to develop a
centre-periphery-model for international knowledge production [Keim 2009; 2010a;
2010b], which also became the basis on which I conceptualized global circulation of
social science knowledge [Keim 2014]. However, while the quantitative and struc-
tural take on global knowledge production clearly indicated a centre-periphery di-
vide, the more interesting part of the study addressed the existence of vibrant social
science communities producing original knowledge despite the strictures and struc-
tures of the international knowledge economy, difficult to detect through quantitative
indicators. One such example that I studied in detail is the development of South
African labour studies from the apartheid era to the 2000s [Keim forth.a]. Instead
of starting from the epistemological debate at a global level and the need to open
mainstream sociology to engage with Southern standpoints, I began my inquiry at
the level of sociological practice.
The question was: under which conditions had the development of this scientif-
ic community succeeded? My conclusion outlines a practical strategy that is very dif-
ferent from Go’s, and yet complements it. As in Go’s work, it involved a critique of
the indigenization debate of the time and of the deconstructive endeavours emerging
out of various places in the global Souths. However, my main point was a slightly
different one. I argued that their major weakness, besides the obvious effects of in-
stitutional and material inequalities at a global level, was not a matter of content, but
a result of their strategy. They addressed a scholarly public that was mildly interested
in including some voices from the South for representational reasons, but were quick
to dismiss earlier efforts as belonging to a bygone phase in the globalization of the
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discipline.1 Mainstream sociology did not see much interest in engaging with those
projects and did not even perceive this lack of interest as problematic. Therefore,
the major weakness of indigenization was its reliance on the dominant arena of com-
petition [Shinn 2000] that it was actually criticizing. Indeed, in order to achieve its
objectives and deploy its theoretical potentials, indigenization needed to be taken
into account within that dominant arena.
It is precisely in this regard that the case of South African labour studies indic-
ates a very different way out: instead of speaking to an audience that hardly listens or
merely takes you for peripheral exotica, they drew their strength from a fundamental
change of orientation towards different arenas: namely the South African scholarly
community and extra-academic actors – trade unions, community organizations, the
broader anti-apartheid movement, journalism; later on government, businesses etc.
It was not epistemological or ontological considerations, no call for revolutionizing
global sociology that gave rise to challenging debate, original thinking and alternative
theorizing. Rather, it was the everyday friction between social theory and political
practice and the ongoing intellectual negotiation and exchange within an integrated
community of scholars and actors. It was a collective achievement, not attributable
to the theoretical genius of individual scholars.
The argument is implicitly inherent in the examples picked by Go: the intellec-
tual productions of Frantz Fanon and Raúl Prebisch. The point is that both of them
were not only intellectuals but practitioners. Prebisch, in particular, in the studies
mentioned by Go, basically produced “policy sociology” [Burawoy 2004, 2005]. Of
course it makes sense to see these studies as enactments of southern standpoints.
But it was the social and political responsibility of their work that guaranteed their
critical attitude towards the received metropolitan wisdoms and their readiness to
question mainstream achievements, their effort to collect empirical data and to ulti-
mately produce alternative theorization. I believe that the social sciences should re-
vise their epistemological tools in order to include the issue of practical responsibility
as a means of scientific validation. A sociologist who engages with extra-academic
actors, who lends his competency to support social movements, who enables polit-
ical or economic strategies, as Raúl Prebisch and the South African colleagues did,
is compelled to revise the conceptual, theoretical and methodological tools at hand.
When realities and actors outside academia resist conventional classifications and call
for social change, the sociologist must be not only critical and deconstructive but
constructive and innovative. She must not only respect scientific standards but be
accountable outside of the academic realm.
x
1 See the presentation of the indigenization debate in Albrow and King [1990]
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In a recent interview, Sitas makes this abundantly clear:
My problem with many postcolonial writers, whom I respect a lot because of their
egalitarian impulse, is getting more pronounced. I raise my core objections in one
of the essays in Theoretical Parables which is called “Exploiting Phumelele Nene:
Postmodernism, Intellectual Work and Ordinary Lives.” Their notion that there are
multiple readings possible in any narrative and our role is to decipher how powers
play themselves out would, and could, lead to cynical apathy. You do not have to risk
failure in your analysis of veracity and reliability in your conclusions. You never have
to take the risk and say it is this explication that is correct and make yourself available
to failure. There has to be a demonstrative aspect of what I am saying as a scientist.
It is not just discourse" [Sitas & Thomas 2016, emphasis added].
In what I decided to call counterhegemonic currents within sociology, like
South African labour studies, the truth or falsehood of a scholarly statement has par-
ticular implications. It is not only important to produce true knowledge for the sake
of scientific truth but because false knowledge can have harmful, if not disastrous
consequences for the people outside of our window and for the world we live in. This
is what favours original thinking. If the Northern-dominated mainstream wants to
avoid gradual provincialization, sooner or later is has to take the intellectual achieve-
ments of such scholarly communities into account. I assume this is the case for Fanon
and Prebisch.
Having presented my complementary argument, I now move on to minor cri-
ticisms. In my view, Go’s paper lacks recognition of complexity in various formula-
tions. For instance, the “subaltern subject” is not singular but multiple, and split into
parts by hierarchies and divides. Our Indian colleagues are often most acutely aware
of this: from which standpoint are you speaking regarding class, caste, gender, gen-
eration, place of origin or diaspora, institutional affiliation etc.? In the same vein, the
southern standpoints are plural. This is, by the way, one of the major criticisms that
have been voiced against Connell’s “Southern Theory” [Arjomand 2008]. And “only
from a single standpoint – the global North” is a gross oversimplification suppressing
similar hierarchical, gendered, institutionalised fractions, and highly heterogeneous
traditions of thought in a variety of languages.
Third, two major questions that lead us beyond Go’s article:
1) It is one thing to argue for “more knowledge” and for “more different know-
ledge”. It is a related, yet different thing to argue for “better knowledge” [Go 2016,
p.34]. The second point relates to the first in as far as Go argues that allowing for
more different knowledge will improve sociology as a whole. However, different does
not necessarily mean equally true. Go rightly states [Ibidem, p.22] that “each map
is open to falsification.” The question here is what criteria we have at hand to dif-
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ferentiate between knowledges and to dismiss those we consider false? The global
scholarly community is fractured and increasingly aware of its internal hierarchies. It
is also increasingly tired of exchanging the same arguments around this deplorable
state of affairs that has been denounced for years, but has yet to change as much as
we would like it to. Therefore this question is a thorny one.
Certainly, perspectival realism and recognition of different standpoints is not
a form of relativism. Still, Go agrees that critiques of North-Atlantic domination,
or metrocentrism, within the discipline have led to a state of affairs where serious
debate is easily inhibited by relativistic arguments. In many discussions across the
boundaries of established scholarly communities arguments of standpoint are mobil-
ized and instrumentalized to justify oneself and disqualify others as if standpoints
alone were decisive for truth and falsehood of a given knowledge. Geopolitical and
identity-political issues are taken for epistemological ones. Interestingly, while it is
still difficult for many colleagues from peripheral locations to make themselves heard
in the international arena, some of them have started to turn the tables to disqualify
knowledge claims of representatives from the dominant metropoles as questionable
or false. Go rightly dismisses claims for epistemic privilege. However, in concrete
encounters, such claims function to silence the opponent and therefore make serious
exchange impossible:
And this slave-master-relationship should go for you to understand who you are.
And to understand who am I. Now I’m saying that the sensitivity that we have here
in this university and that this enterprise of, not as I say, it’s not indigenization of
knowledge, but, universalization of knowledge. Islamization of knowledge is not an
indigenization of knowledge. Now, we wanted knowledge actually to restore that
universal category that it did have. And we feel that we are more qualified than our
masters in Germany” [Zein, Interview 26.4.2012].2
This can go along with simplistic versions of relativism:
So it’s different social norms, intellectual norms, but we have to allow for this. If you
are talking about pluralism or plurality of views, well okay, this is it. I mean you have
to be prepared if you go to Mecca, then women cannot drive. Just have to accept
that. That’s a norm in Mecca [Hassan, Interview 24.4.2012].
Hanafi makes an important complementary point highlighting the practical and
political implications of relativistic arguments. From his standpoint as editor of Idafat:
The Arab Journal of Sociology and a member of the editorial boards for many Arab
x
2 This and the following quotes are from interviews I conducted at International Islamic University
of Malaysia (IIUM), Kuala Lumpur, in 2012. The topics of debate were the meaning and practice of
Islamised social science, one of the key institutional missions of IIUM.
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and international academic journals [Hanafi 2016, 25], he warns that cultural and
moral relativisms are not merely an epistemological problem:
The quasi-conspiratorial apologetic and defensive claims become tools to justify
local repression and even torture. Postcolonial scholars in the Arab region and
sometimes some leftists in the West have rarely articulated a set of internal and
external influences that shaped the political landscape of the Arab World [Ibidem,
26].
All this shows that as long as material and power divides persist it is very hard
to agree on a common epistemological basis to distinguish between true and false
knowledge [Keim Forth.b].3 How can we organize an exchange on equal footing in
practice? Who has the credibility to establish common criteria to distinguish between
true and false explications? What could common standards look like?
2) Interestingly, those are not really new questions for sociology. In fact, multi-
ple incommensurable social theories – to start with, the imagined “canon” of Marx,
Weber and Durkheim – have always coexisted within sociology. One last question
is therefore that of the relationship between different standpoints and different the-
ories. In fact, a standpoint does not provide you with a theory. Even if we break
down the supposed “single standpoint” of the North into many, it does not seem that
different standpoints end up producing different types of theory. Similar or equal
standpoints do not necessarily generate similar theories. Apparently, the problem is
much more complex; perspective does not necessarily account in itself for different
knowledge. How important, then, is perspective at all? What other reasons are there
for the existence of different theories? How are standpoints articulated with those
other reasons for theoretical difference?
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